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An Alternative Ethics? Justice and Care as Guiding Principles for
Qualitative Research
Most  discussions  of  social  research  ethics  have  tended  to  employ
deontological  and/or  consequentialist  forms  of  argument  –  concerned
with  minimizing  harm,  respecting  the  autonomy  of  participants,
preserving their privacy,  and so on. Moreover, these sorts of principle
inform the mode of ethical regulation that, in many Western countries,
has  now  spread  from  medicine  and  psychology  across  social  science
generally (Israel and Hay 2006; Authors 2012:ch1). There has been some
tension between this dominant form of research ethics and the ways in
which many qualitative researchers approach their work; and, in recent
times, some have set out a very different approach, foregrounding other
values. Thus, Lincoln has proposed ‘a vision of research that enables and
promotes social justice, community, diversity, civic discourse and caring’
(Lincoln  1995:277-8);  and  Mertens  et  al  (2009:88)  have  advocated  a
‘transformative’  approach  in  which  the  central  question  is:  ‘How can
research  contribute  to  social  justice  and  the  furtherance  of  human
rights?’. The advocates of this position, or this set of positions, see it ‘as a
powerful  antidote  to  the  deception-based,  utilitarian  IRB [Institutional
Review Board] system’ (Denzin and Giardina 2007:28). 
In  this  article  we  want  to  examine  this  alternative  approach  to
research ethics, focusing particularly on the suggestion that justice and
care should be guiding principles for social researchers. Given that ‘ethics
review’ is now a requirement for all social research, it is important to be
clear about the principles on which this ought to operate.
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The case for the new ethics
Since Denzin and Giardina (2007) have provided the most comprehensive
presentation of this alternative approach, and Denzin is among the most
influential  writers  on qualitative methodology today,  we will  use their
account as the primary basis for our assessment.1 These authors propose
‘a  methodology  of  the  heart,  a  performative,  indigenous,  feminist,
communitarian ethic that embraces an ethics of truth grounded in love,
care, hope,  and forgiveness’  (p12). Central to this is  a commitment to
‘create mutually life-enhancing opportunities for all people’ (Darder and
Mirón  2006:150,  quoted  in  Denzin  and  Giardina  2007:12).  What  is
advocated here is a ‘participatory mode of knowing’. Thus, Denzin and
Giardina write:
In a feminist,  communitarian model,  participants have a coequal
say in how research should be conducted, what should be studied,
which  methods  should  be  used,  which  findings  are  ‘valid’  and
acceptable, how the findings are to be implemented, and how the
consequences of such actions are to be assessed. (p29)
Indigenous scholars are portrayed as in the vanguard of promoting
this  new ethic,  in ‘disrupt[ing] traditional  ways of  knowing [i.e.  those
characteristic of most social science], while developing “methodologies
and approaches to research that privilege indigenous knowledges, voices,
and experiences” (Smith, 2005, p. 87)’ (p13). This is seen as exemplified
by the Kaupapa Maori model in which researchers ‘listen and participate
… in a process that facilitates the development in people of a sense of
themselves  as  agentic  and  of  having  an  authoritative  voice’  (Bishop
1 For other sources, see Mertens and Ginsberg 2009, and Christians 2011.
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1998:207-8;  quoted  in  Denzin  and  Giardina  2007:14).  Here  ‘the
researcher  is  led  by  members  of  the  community’  (p14),  rather  than
carrying out research ‘on’ them (see also Cram 2009).2 
Furthermore, Denzin and Giardina (2007:15) propose that research
should be evaluated in terms of  ‘concrete  experience as a criterion of
meaning  and  truth’,  and  according  to  an  approach  that  ‘privileges
storytelling, listening, voice, and personal performance narratives’. There
is  a  clear  break  here  from  more  conventional  scientific  accounts  of
assessment criteria. And there is also a change in goal. From this point of
view: 
the purpose of research is not the production of new knowledge
per se. Rather, the purposes are pedagogical, political, moral, and
ethical, involving the enhancement of moral agency, the production
of moral discernment, a commitment to praxis, justice, an ethic of
resistance,  and  a  performative  pedagogy  that  resists  oppression
(Denzin and Giardina 2007:18). 
This approach is sometimes seen as dissolving the sorts of ethical
problem surrounding research that are the focus of conventional research
ethics:
[…]  subjects  and  researchers  develop  collaborative,  public,
pedagogical  relationships.  The  walls  between  subjects  and
observers are deliberately broken down. Confidentiality disappears,
for  there  is  nothing  to  hide  or  protect.  Participation  is  entirely
2 Similar arguments for participatory forms of inquiry have been developed in the field of Childhood 
Studies, see for example Kellett 2005 and Pascal and Bertram 2009, and also in research concerned 
with people who have disabilities, see Oliver 1992; Barnes 2009.
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voluntary,  hence  there  is  no  need  for  subjects  to  sign  forms
indicating that their consent is “informed”. The activities that make
up the research  are  participatory;  that  is,  they are  performative,
collaborative, and action and praxis based. Hence, participants are
not asked to submit to specific procedures or treatment conditions.
Instead, acting together, researchers and subjects work to produce
change in the world. (Denzin and Giardina 2007:20)
As this makes clear, the new thinking about research ethics draws
on more general ideas about the purpose of research and about human
social life. Denzin and Giardina (2007:29) locate it within:
a sacred, existential epistemology [that] places humans in a non-
competitive,  nonhierarchical  relationship  to  the  earth,  to  nature,
and  to  the  larger  world.  This  sacred  epistemology  stresses  the
values of empowerment, shared governance, care, solidarity, love,
community,  covenant,  morally  involved  observers,  and  civic
transformation.  This  ethical  epistemology  recovers  the  moral
values that were excluded by the rational Enlightenment science
project.
While the approach may be presented as ‘a universal human ethic’, at the
same time it is ‘based on locally experienced, culturally prescribed proto-
norms (Christians,  1995,  p.  129)’.  These  primal  norms are  viewed as
providing a ‘defensible “conception of good rooted in universal human
solidarity” (Christians,  1995, p.  129; see also Christians,  1997, 1998)’
(Denzin and Giardina 2007:29). 
What is envisaged by this alternative ethics is a transformation of
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social  research  that  has  wide  socio-political  consequences  (see  also
Mertens et al 2009). Denzin and Giardina (2007:35) write:
[…]  this  model  directs  scholars  to  take  up  moral  projects  that
decolonize, honor, and reclaim indigenous cultural practices. Such
work  produces  spiritual,  social,  and  psychological  healing.
Healing, in turn, leads to multiple forms of transformation at the
personal and social levels. These transformations shape processes
of  mobilization  and  collective  action.  And  these  actions  help
persons realize a radical politics of possibility, of hope, of love,
care, and equality for all humanity.
An initial response
At  the  most  abstract  level,  there  seem  to  be  two  fundamental
commitments  that  differentiate  this  alternative  research  ethics  from
mainstream social science research and the approach to ethics frequently
associated with it. First, as with various forms of ‘critical’ and activist
social inquiry, the goal is taken to be bringing about particular sorts of
change in the world rather  than ‘the production of  knowledge  per se’
(Denzin and Giardina 2007:18). Moreover, to the extent that producing
knowledge remains the goal,  mainstream conceptualizations of this are
challenged on the basis that they reflect a Western Enlightenment mode
of thought. This is to be replaced by respect for the distinctive modes of
knowing  of  the  people  being  studied,  with  the  knowledge  produced
becoming  ‘performative’  rather  than  propositional  in  character.  Here,
indigenous groups are treated as a key exemplar, but the point is clearly
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intended to extend to other marginalized or oppressed groups as well.3 
The  second  major  difference  from  the  mainstream  approach
concerns the ethical ideas that it is proposed should characterise relations
between researchers and researched. While there is some overlap here,
Denzin and Giardina’s (2007) account, and those of others, employ many
ethical concepts that are not generally to be found, at least not explicitly,
in  mainstream  accounts.  Examples  would  include:  love,  forgiveness,
solidarity,  hope,  and  resistance.  Moreover,  even  in  the  case  of  those
concepts that are shared, it is fairly clear that they are being interpreted in
distinctive  ways.  Perhaps  the  most  significant  sign  of  this  is  that
proponents of the alternative ethics often argue that these concepts imply
that the people being studied should participate in the central decisions
that  govern  the  research.  This  is  a  significant  departure  from  the
mainstream  approach.  Presumably  the  rationale  for  this  second
commitment, at least in part, is that research must itself exemplify the
form of social  relations that it  should be aiming to bring about in the
wider society, thereby ensuring consistency between ends and means.
In  assessing  this  alternative  approach  to  research  ethics,  our
starting point is a belief that the standard approach is too narrow, and that
it is misconceived in key respects (see Authors 2012; Author 2013). So,
we agree that considerable rethinking is required. At the same time, we
find major problems with what is proposed by Denzin and Giardina, and
by those adopting a similar approach. 
 
One  problem is  that  the  principles  underpinning this  alternative
3 Given this, the problematic, and highly contentious, issue of how ‘indigenous’ is to be defined, and of
how indigenous groups are to be identified, can be left on one side. On this, see Coates 2004:Intro.
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ethics are far from clear. There is insufficient explication of the meaning
of the many terms used to characterize the approach. Yet these cannot be
viewed as self-explanatory. For example, Denzin and Giardina state that
the approach is to be ‘feminist’, but this term tells us little on its own,
since there are conflicting versions of feminism (see, for example, Kemp
and Squires 1997). Similarly, how are we to interpret such words as ‘life-
enhancing’,  ‘the enhancement  of  moral  agency’,  or  ‘the production of
moral discernment’? These, too, are open to divergent interpretations. For
example, the concept of ‘life-enhancing’ attitudes is to be found in the
writings of  Nietzsche,  but  his ‘transvaluation of  all  values’  (Nietzsche
1895; Leiter and Sinhababu 2007) is sharply at odds with what Denzin
and  Giardina  propose.  Similar  problems  even  arise  with  the  more
common ethical terms deployed, such as ‘care’ and ‘justice’, as we shall
see. 
A  second  problem  is  that  little  supporting  argumentation  is
provided by advocates of this alternative ethics to justify their proposed
redefinition of the goal of social research, and their reconceptualisation of
what  is  ethical  in  research  practice.  Thus,  in  large  part,  Denzin  and
Giardina’s  argument  relies  upon  the  use  of  evaluative  terms  that  are
treated  as  if  they  were  self-validating,  such  as  ‘communitarian’,
‘participatory’, ‘democratic’, etc; as well as on the deployment of various
other  words  that  have  a  presumed  negative  connotation,  such  as
‘deception-based’, ‘utilitarian’, and ‘rational Enlightenment science’. Not
only does this effectively discourage any questioning of the grounds for
the new ethics, it also suggests that there are just two opposing positions.
Yet, any attempt to unpack the meaning of these positive and negative
terms would soon show that  there is much variation in what they can
imply. As we have already hinted by referring to Nietzsche, there is a
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complex field of ethical views that stand in opposition to ‘Enlightenment
science’  (Denzin  and  Giardina  2007:29);  and  the  differences  amongst
these are probably as fundamental as their collective opposition to the
Enlightenment. Given this, a clear account is required of the distinctive
features of the position being adopted – in comparison with other anti-
Enlightenment stances. Equally, there needs to be engagement with likely
criticisms coming from those holding other views. Yet there is little sign
of this: despite reference to a ‘dialogic ethic of love, hope, and solidarity’
(Denzin  and  Giardina  2007:28),  in  practice  there  appears  to  be  little
commitment  to  dialogue  displayed  in  how this  alternative  account  of
research ethics is often presented. 
A third problem is that there are almost certainly likely to be severe
conflicts amongst the large number of principles that make up the new 
ethics, and there is no indication of how these are to be resolved. For 
example, how is a commitment to love and forgiveness to be reconciled 
with ‘an ethic of resistance’? One example of a resistance ethic would be 
the political perspective of Frantz Fanon, with his idea that violence is a 
‘cleansing force’, freeing ‘the native from his inferiority complex and 
from his despair and inaction’  (Fanon 1963:94; see also Caute 1970 and 
Gibson 2003:ch5), but this would surely be at odds with other elements of
the alternative ethics proposed by Denzin and Giardina. Similarly, how 
compatible are feminist positions with most indigenous cultural 
perspectives? We suggest that there are likely to be conflicts there too: 
the social relations traditional within at least some indigenous 
communities are open to challenge on grounds of sex and age 
discrimination.
Finally, there are questions about the practical feasibility of what is
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proposed. There is a strongly utopian strain in the alternative ethics. What
seems to be envisaged is the establishment of a communal or solidaristic
form of social  relation between researcher and researched,  this in turn
leading to the spread of such relations more widely. This is the basis for
the  claim  that  the  sort  of  protections  that  are  emphasized  by  the
mainstream approach to research ethics – notably informed consent and
preservation  of  anonymity  –  are  unnecessary  (Denzin  and  Giardina
2007:20). The type of community envisaged is one in which there are no
secrets and no divisions of interest, presumably reflecting a total devotion
to the common good. Yet there are at least potential divisions within all
communities,  and  considerable  dangers  associated  with  attempts  to
repress  these  in  the  name  of  solidarity  (Hastrup  and  Elsass  1990).
Furthermore, unlike Marxists, who insist that such a community would
only be attainable after a revolution, some advocates of the new ethics,
including  Denzin  and  Giardina, seem to  believe  that  it  is  possible  to
achieve this ideal under present social conditions, and through the process
of research. But we are given no reasons for this optimism in the face of
past experience.
There  are  other  practical  problems  too,  some  of  which  are
highlighted by the following questions: Is it being suggested that this new
ethical approach should be adopted whichever group of people is being
researched,  so that  for  example  it  would be appropriate  in  a  study of
investment bankers or Right-Wing terrorists? Is there a commitment to
the  further  development  of  their ‘authoritative  voice’  (Denzin  and
Giardina  2007:14)?  Or  is  the implication  that  researchers  should  only
study those groups with whom they share a sense of political or ethical
solidarity?  And,  if  so,  why?  Furthermore,  advocacy  of  participatory
modes of inquiry is hardly new, and attempts to employ them have run
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into recurrent difficulties. One of these has been reluctance to participate
on the part of those being researched (Acker et al 1991; Birch and Miller
2012).  Another  is  an  understandable  need  by  researchers  to  curb  or
modify participation when it threatens to go in directions that they cannot
tolerate in ethical or political terms, for example the communication of
sexist or racist messages (Hearn and Thomson 2014:158). These are not
just minor problems of implementation, they raise fundamental questions
about the relationship between the ideal  of  participation and the other
values to which the alternative ethics appears to be committed. However,
there is no discussion of these practical issues by Denzin and Giardina, or
by most other advocates of this approach to research ethics.4
In  the  remainder  of  this  paper  we  will  explore  some  of  these
problems a little further, focusing on two of the principles that seem to be
central to the new ethics: justice and care. Both have been given detailed
consideration in the philosophical literature, and we will draw upon this
in examining them.
Justice as a principle guiding social research
While it  has not  always been at  the forefront in  discussions  of  social
research  ethics,  the  principle  of  justice  has  nevertheless  been  present
within them for a long time (see Denzin and Giardina 2007:23). Indeed,
justice was listed as a central principle in one of the most influential early
statements  on  research  ethics:  the  Belmont  Report  (1979).  And it  has
retained its position in much subsequent discussion – especially where
4 See Miller et al 2012 for an example of researchers who, while sharing something of the same 
orientation as the new ethicists, have recognised the dilemmas generated by the ways in which ethical 
principles can conflict in the implications they have for particular situations.
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the explicit or implicit model has been that of medical research (see Kahn
et al  1998; Beauchamp and Childress 2012),  a model that  came to be
extended  across  social  science  as  a  result  of  the  spread  of  ethical
regulation. At the same time, King et al (1999:9) have pointed out that
justice  is  ‘the least  well-understood and most  neglected  of  the  ethical
principles presented in the Belmont Report’, a point that we will take up. 
The concept of justice is also evident in a longstanding concern on
the part of qualitative researchers with maintaining ‘reciprocity’ in their
relations with the people they are studying (Author 2007:217-8). This is
the idea that there should be a balance between what each side gains from
the research relationship (Wax 1982 and 1986; Harrison et al 2001). It
has been argued that in some forms of social research the researcher gains
much  more  than  the  people  studied:  researchers  are  portrayed  as
extracting data and information for  free,  in  order to  generate  research
products which, even if these do not produce immediate financial return
for them, nevertheless potentially provide benefits in terms of reputation
and promotion prospects.  In  effect,  the  charge  is  that  the  relationship
between  researcher  and  researched  has  sometimes  been,  or  perhaps
intrinsically is, exploitative. This is clearly an issue of justice.5
Appeals to the notion of justice are also frequently present in the
defences that researchers have offered against charges of exploitation. For
example they argue that the people studied often obtain benefits from the
research process,  at the very least in having someone to listen to their
problems.  Indeed,  it  is  suggested  that  many  participants  enjoy  being
interviewed, and may find it therapeutic. Plummer (1995:34) notes that in
5 Interestingly, this sort of argument is to be found in an especially sharp form in the feminist 
literature, where it is claimed that feminists studying women may be able to establish relationships 
involving much greater closeness and trust than in other kinds of inquiry, giving rise to disclosure of 
very private experiences and information (Finch 1984; Stacey 1988; Birch and Miller 2012). 
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the case of life history interviews: ‘for many the telling of a tale comes as
a  major  way  of  “discovering  who  one  really  is”’.  Beyond  this,  it  is
pointed  out  that  qualitative  researchers,  especially  ethnographers,
frequently  provide  minor  services  of  various  kinds,  from reading  and
writing  letters,  through  to  babysitting  or  supplying  low-level  medical
treatment.  Occasionally,  they  will  even  offer  payment  to  people  to
participate in research.
However,  the  conception  of  justice  that  informs  the  alternative
ethics seems to be significantly different from that present in bioethics,
and even from qualitative researchers’  concerns about reciprocity.  The
difference is in line with a trend noted by King et al (1999:9): that in
recent  years  ‘justice  has  begun  to  appear  as  a  stronger,  more  active
principle – one that is related to past, present, and future distributions of
power’. These authors comment that ‘this evolution reflects the view that
research is part of a comprehensive system that unfairly distributes power
and its perquisites, and that it is incumbent on researchers to compensate
for  both  the  past  sins  of  research  and  the  state  of  the  world’.  One
implication  drawn  from  this,  they  suggest,  has  been  that  ‘the
empowerment of  research subjects  is  an ethical  imperative’. It  is  very
much  in  these  terms  that  Denzin  and  Giardina  (2007:24)  argue  that
‘justice extends beyond fair selection procedures or the fair distribution of
the benefits of research across a population. Justice involves principles of
care, love, kindness, fairness, and commitment to shared responsibility, to
honesty, truth, balance, and harmony’. 
 
It should be clear from this that the concept of justice is open to
different interpretations. In fact, while this concept has long been a focus
for  philosophical  discussion,  and  its  importance  has  been  almost
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universally accepted, this has not resulted in substantial agreement about
its nature. Barry (1989:133) declares that it ‘still has no settled meaning’
after 2000 years of discussion. He suggests that it is ‘the paradigm case of
an essentially contested concept’.6
Denzin and Giardina (2007) seem to adopt a very broad conception
of justice, which incorporates many of the other principles they mention.
While they are not alone in taking a broad view – this can be traced back
to Plato – there are serious problems with this approach. In particular, it
tends  to  assume  a  pre-established  harmony between  justice  and  other
principles. Yet this seems implausible, since we are frequently faced with
dilemmas,  of  varying  degrees  of  seriousness,  generated  by  conflicts
amongst the principles to which we are committed, and these are often
recalcitrant  in  theoretical  terms  even  if  they  can  be  dealt  with
pragmatically (Stocker 1990).7 There is no reason to believe that  such
conflicts will disappear, or be easier to deal with, in the future. Moreover,
attempts permanently to eliminate them frequently result in some form of
totalitarianism, a charge that has of course been directed at Plato (Popper
1945; Taylor 1999). 
In light of these problems, more recent philosophical discussions
have focused upon narrower senses of ‘justice’ (Raphael  2001). These
concern  two  main  sorts  of  issue.  First,  whether  some  particular
distribution  of  goods  (or,  correlatively,  of  costs  or  disadvantages)  is
equitable,  and how we are to determine what is  and is not  equitable.8
Secondly, there is the notion of ‘just desert’,  which is concerned with
what is, and is not, an appropriate response, in terms of punishment or
6 On the idea of ‘essentially contested concepts’ see Gallie 1956.
7 Sandel 2009 also adopts a broad conception of justice, treating it as concerned with ‘What’s 
the right thing to do?’. However, he recognises the ethical dilemmas that we frequently face in 
answering that question.
8It is important to note that an equitable distribution is not necessarily the same as an equal distribution.
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reward, to some offence or to some virtuous action, and how this is to be
determined. 
For convenience, these two narrower conceptions of justice can be
labeled  the  ‘economic’  and  ‘legal’  interpretations  of  the  concept,
respectively.  Moreover,  each  of  them  is  itself  open  to  different
formulations.  For  example,  the  economic  interpretation  may  involve
evaluation  of  a  distribution  of  goods  or  ills  in  terms of  universalistic
equality (as in Bentham’s utilitarianism, where each individual is to count
equally in the calculation of what would produce ‘the greatest happiness
of the greatest number’), in relation to need (as a famous quotation from
Marx  has  it),  or  according  to  contribution  (for  those  who  believe  in
meritocracy).  Similarly,  the legal  approach need not  be restricted to  a
concern with appropriate punishment or the reward of virtue, it can be
extended  to  include  recognition  of  rights,  where  there  are  important
issues about who has what rights, and under what conditions these can be
exercised, waived, forfeited, or overruled (see Jones 1994). 
So,  even with these narrower interpretations of ‘justice’ there is
considerable scope for disagreement about what would and would not be
just. This also arises because, in each case, any judgment is necessarily
underpinned by assumptions of various kinds. As regards the economic
interpretation of justice, these concern what are to count as benefits and
costs, and the degree of these in particular instances. In the case of the
legal interpretation, there is dependence upon prior judgments about what
is offensive and virtuous, and about what would be appropriate responses
to varying degrees and kinds of offence or virtue, or alternatively about
what do and do not count as legitimate rights and what priorities ought to
operate  amongst  them.  Differences  in  these  assumptions  frequently
produce discrepant views about what is and is not just  or equitable in
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particular cases.9 
Aside from these issues, we also need to consider whether and how
any broad or narrow notion of justice ought to be applied to the case of
research: as regards either its goals or the means it employs. In the first
place, what are the grounds for arguing, in the manner of the alternative
ethics outlined by Denzin and Giardina, that the goal of research should
be to achieve justice in society or at least to reduce the level of injustice?
To propose that furthering the establishment of just social relations, or at
least challenging unjust ones, should be a central goal of social research
is, of course, in line with the position of much 'critical' research, as well
as that coming under more specific headings such as feminist  or  anti-
racist inquiry. However, in our view, there are good reasons not to treat
this as part of the goal of research, even if justice ought to serve as an
extrinsic ethical constraint on its pursuit (Authors 2012). One reason is
that social researchers are not in a privileged position to determine what
would and would not count as justice, in other words to interpret what
this essentially contested concept implies for particular cases. To claim
otherwise, even under the guise of promoting participatory inquiry, is to
abuse the authority of research – to appeal to it in promoting a particular
conception  of  justice  (and  injustice)  that  it  cannot  warrant.  Equally
important, researchers do not usually have the power to promote justice
on any wide scale.  If  this  is  one’s  goal,  then carrying out  research is
unlikely to be the most effective strategy. 
It is important here to recognise the distinction between, on the one
hand, the motives that researchers may have for engaging in research, and
9 Concern with justice conceived in terms of rights has been central to discussions of the ethics of 
research involving children, and the scope for variation in judgments about these rights is evident there:
see Author 2014. 
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for pursuing particular sorts of knowledge – which may well involve the
belief or hope that this will promote a more just society – and, on the
other hand, formulating the very goal of research as to promote justice, so
that the research is designed to achieve this. The first position is entirely
legitimate in our view: it makes no claim to expertise based on research
in determining what is and is not just. However, the second certainly does
do this. It also increases the danger of bias, since researchers will often be
torn between doing what they judge to be most likely to promote justice
and acting in the most effective way so as to produce sound knowledge:
True findings do not necessarily aid the achievement of justice, and
false findings  can do so. As a result,  any attempt to ensure that
research serves justice may lead to the findings being distorted, in
other  words  to  the  research  deviating  from  the  pursuit  of  true
findings. Seeking findings that will aid justice is not the same as
seeking  the  truth,  there  is  considerable  scope  for  conflict  here
(Stoczkowski 2008).
The idea that there is a close affinity between truth and justice is one
element of (some versions of) Enlightenment thought that certainly does
need to be rejected.
As regards the role of justice in how research is carried out, there
are issues here about what weight  ought to be given to this  value,  as
compared  with  other  ethical  principles,  and  as  against  the  distinctive
responsibility  of  researchers  to  try  to  ensure  that  the  findings  they
produce are sound. Generally speaking, the significance of justice in this
respect,  as  compared  with  other  values,  seems  to  us  to  be  lower  for
qualitative  research  than  it  is  for  investigations  in  the  biomedical
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sciences, which as we noted are often treated as the paradigm for research
ethics.  This is  because qualitative research does not  distribute benefits
and costs that are highly significant for most people’s lives, in the way
that medical trials do. Instead, there will usually be only minor costs and
benefits deriving, usually indirectly, from participation in the research. 
By  contrast,  advocates  of  the  alternative  ethics  heighten  the
significance of justice as a value. They believe that it requires that the
people whose lives are being investigated must participate on (at least)
equal  terms  in  making  research  decisions.  There  seem  to  be  two
arguments  here.  One  is  that  doing  research  ‘on’  people  rather  than
involving them in the decision-making process is viewed as itself unjust,
because  it  involves  a  differential  distribution  of  rights  or  power.
Secondly, the argument that doing research on certain types of people,
without  involving  them  in  research  decisions,  is  unjust  because  it  is
believed that the wider context – within which the research functions –
marginalizes  or  oppresses  those  people  (Meskell  and  Pels  2005;  Pels
2010). Here, the implication is that a participatory approach is required in
order to counterbalance this.
Neither of these arguments is convincing in our view. There is little
justification  for  assuming  that  all  role  differentiation  and  associated
differential distribution of power is unjust. No society operates, or could
operate,  without  role  differentiation  and  the  power  differences  this
generates – certainly not a large complex society. One key question that
must  be  addressed  therefore  is:  what  are  and  are  not  legitimate
differences in the exercise of power? So the question that advocates of the
new ethics must address is why it is unjust for researchers to determine
what  to study,  how to investigate  it,  etc.  Moreover,  it  is  important  to
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recognize  that  the  obverse  of  power,  in  this  context  as  in  others,  is
responsibility:  it  is  the researcher’s  responsibility  to  try to ensure that
sound knowledge is produced, and also that the research is carried out in
an  ethically  acceptable  manner.  Participatory  inquiry  makes  these
responsibilities even more difficult to meet and muddies the question of
responsibility (Author 2004).
As regards the other argument – that participatory inquiry can lead
to wider injustices being reduced or overturned – this is open to serious
question. Denzin and Giardina provide no evidence that it can have this
effect, that it is a more effective strategy than those employed currently
and  in  the  past  by  the  various  political  movements  and  agencies
committed  to  achieving  justice  of  various  sorts:  from  revolutionary
workers’  parties  campaigning  on  the  streets,  through  guerilla  armies
attacking key installations, to the United Nations promoting international
agreements. Such evidence is necessary because, at face value, this claim
about  the  transformative  power  of  research  is  implausible  against  the
background of  past  experience.  Also doubtful  is  whether  participatory
inquiry produces sound scientific knowledge. Indeed, we suggest that the
alternative  ethics  involves  abandoning  social  science  in  favour  of  a
vaguely defined communal mode of inquiry that is close in character to
the sort of conscientisation advocated long ago by Freire (1972, 1985).
Such activity may well be worthwhile, but it should not be disguised as
social scientific research (Author 2008). 
In the next section we will look at another of the key principles that
is at the core of the proposed alternative to mainstream research ethics:
care.
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The ethics of care
Like justice, care is also a principle that is sometimes to be found in the
mainstream  approach  to  research  ethics.  In  the  context  of  medical
research, care of patients is, of course, a central concern. This underpins
the principle of beneficence, which is included in the Belmont Report and
other  statements  of  research  ethics  in  this  field:  the  requirement  that
research must produce more beneficial than harmful results for the people
involved. By contrast, outside of the health field much less emphasis has
generally been placed upon care as an ethical principle – since the people
being  studied  are  not  usually  in  ill-health,  and  are  not  usually  being
subjected to an intervention that  could cause them pain and harm. Of
course,  a concern with care may still  arise in certain areas:  where the
research is linked to one of the other ‘caring professions’ and/or where it
deals with groups deemed to be vulnerable. What is distinctive about the
alternative  ethics  is  that,  by  contrast,  it  insists  that  care,  like  justice,
should have a high priority across the board. Once again, though, there
are questions about why this is believed, and what it entails.
While Denzin and Giardina (2007) do not elaborate on what they
mean  by  ‘care’,  there  is  a  considerable  body  of  feminist  work  that
emphasises this value. This develops a moral perspective that takes as its
exemplar women’s distinctive experiences of nurturing and mothering.10
These  are  seen  as  involving  a  relationship  that  is  characterised  by
asymmetrical  dependence  rather  than  mutual  independence;  and  the
concept of need, rather than that of right, is taken as central. Furthermore,
10 The ethics of care has been given somewhat different formulations by different writers, and 
developed in various ways in response to criticism. See, for example, Gilligan 1982; Noddings 1984; 
Ruddick 1989; Held 1993; Dancy 1992, Bowden 1997, Jaggar 2000, and Held 2006.
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supporters  of  care  ethics  often  reject  the  notion  of  general  moral
principles  and  insist  that  ‘relations,  not  individuals,  are  ontologically
basic’  (Noddings  2003:xiii),  with  these  relations  conceived  of  as
particularistic rather than universalistic in character. In this way, care is
not treated as simply one ethical principle amongst others but more as an
attitude  or  sensibility  that  shapes,  or  should  shape,  all  aspects  of
behaviour towards others.11
The central emphasis,  then,  is  on the interdependence of human
beings and their responsibilities to each other, rather than on individuals
and their  rights.  Caring is a disposition,  one that  requires attending to
others with emotional sensitivity, with compassion and empathy, in ways
that take account of the specific context of action. In addition, the ethics
of care views what is  involved in  caring as a  process that  fosters  the
intellectual and emotional growth of those participating in it; especially,
but not only, those who are most vulnerable (see Meagher and Parton,
2004). So, care ethicists stress that we should make decisions about what
would be right or wrong, good or bad, in ways that take account of our
own relationship to the people who would be affected by the decision and
of their level of vulnerability.  They insist not only that, as a matter of
fact, we feel different obligations to different people, but also that it is
right  to  treat  people  differently  on  this  basis,  rather  than  adopting  a
universalistic orientation. There are at least two aspects to this. One is
that  some categories of  person,  such as children,  should be viewed as
more vulnerable than others, and therefore as more in need of care than
11Noddings (1984:5) argues that while, generally speaking, this sensibility is more typical of women 
than of men, a caring attitude can and should be central for men too. The ethics of care has been 
particularly influenced by the work of the psychologist Carol Gilligan (1983), who argued that women 
differ from men in the character of their ethical judgments. There has been some dispute about both the
soundness and implications of Gilligan’s empirical research findings, see Broughton 1983; Walker 
1984.
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others.  The  second  is  that  we  have  specific  relationships  with  some
people that imply an obligation on our part to care, or to care more, for
them. Thus, while it can be argued that all adults in a community have
some obligation to care for the children in that community, parents have a
stronger  and  fuller  obligation  of  this  kind  in  relation  to  their  own
children.
This  approach  to  ethics  has  been  the  focus  for  considerable
discussion, and it has been criticised even by many feminists. Some have
complained  that  it  tends  to  legitimize  the  existing  sexual  division  of
labour,  serving to  reinforce  those social  relations of  oppression which
make looking after children the primary responsibility of the mother, and
that require the mother to subordinate her interests to those of the child.
The  charge  is,  in  effect,  that  the  notion  of  care  is  at  odds  with  the
principle of justice. Indeed, some suggest that feminine values of care are
themselves symptoms of subordination and dependency, not unlike the
Christian virtues that Nietzsche denounced as a slave morality (Bowden
1997:8).
There have also been criticisms of the ethics of care as a form of
essentialism: by grounding ethics in the relationship between mother and
child ‘caring comes to be perceived as an innate characteristic of women
and therefore a natural determinant of women’s social possibilities and
roles’ (Bowden 1997:8). It reinforces common stereotypes of the ‘good
woman’ who would ‘sacrifice’ herself for the benefit of those in her care
(Card 1990; see also Bartky 1990), thereby setting up a standard in terms
of which some women are judged not just  as insufficiently caring but
effectively as not proper women.
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Others have questioned whether the mother-child relationship can
provide an adequate model for other types of social relationship, and for
thinking  about  all  of  the  many  kinds  of  issue  to  which  ethical
considerations are relevant. In response, Noddings (2002) has argued that
we need to understand home practices where real care occurs in order to
be able to develop effective policies that address wider matters of social
justice (see also Robinson, 1999). And others have sought to develop the
ethics of care in ways that apply it to broader, and indeed global, issues
(see, for instance, Held 1993 and 2005). 
There  have  been  few  attempts  to  apply  the  ethics  of  care  to
research ethics.12 However, it seems clear that the implications are very
much along the lines characteristic of the alternative ethics outlined by
Denzin  and  Giardina  (2007).  Thus,  according  to  Gunzenhauser
(2006:626) an ethic of care would require ‘fluid research goals’ since the
researcher must set aside her/his own concerns, and become ‘engrossed’
in  others’ experiences:  ‘the  relation  between  the  researcher  and  the
researched is characterized by particularity, mutual critique, and tentative
understanding’ (p630). The researcher seeks to respect ‘the human dignity
of the research participants’ and what this amounts to has to be learned
from interaction with them in particular contexts. 
In these terms, the ethics of care challenges the sorts of relationship
that researchers typically build with participants. This is most obvious in
the case of  those characteristic  of  experimental  and survey research –
brief, highly formalised interchanges designed to elicit data from people
(see Oakley 1981). The relationships between researcher and researched
typical of qualitative research are usually less formal and restricted, and it
12 But see Gunzenhauser 2006, Ellis 2007, and Miller et al 2012.
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might  therefore  be  assumed  that  these  are  less  open  to  criticism.
However,  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  These  relationships  can  be
criticised  from  the  perspective  of  the  ethics  of  care  as  a  form  of
deception: in effect, qualitative researchers build ‘friendly’ relations with
participants  for  the  purposes  of  research,  so  that  the  care  involved is
spurious. In short, researchers feign a caring attitude in order to achieve
research goals. A direct parallel here would be the salesperson who uses a
friendly and apparently caring manner in order to boost sales. It can be
suggested  that  such  attenuated  and  deceitful  forms  of  social  relation,
along  with  the  more  superficial  ones  characteristic  of  other  types  of
research,  represent  a  deformation  of  caring  human  relations,  and  are
therefore unethical.
It seems to us that this challenge needs to be viewed in light of
some of the criticisms of the ethics of care that we outlined earlier. This
approach to ethics certainly points to features of research relationships
that have ethical significance, but it relies upon a single model of what
would constitute a caring relationship;  and an idealised image even of
that relationship. Bowden (1997) points to the way in which what counts
as  a  caring  relationship  varies  considerably  across  contexts.  Her
conclusion is that ‘the ethical possibilities of care emerge as constituively
shaped  by  the  practices  in  which  they  are  embedded;  as  intricately
connected  with  the  possibilities  of  other  ethical  concepts,  such  as
responsiveness,  self-understanding,  reciprocity,  trust,  respect,  openness
and vulnerability; as inherently conflicted; and as always open to further
discussion and interpretation’ (pp16-17). Thus, for example, caring on the
part of nurses, even when the patients are children, is properly framed by
distinctive limits that make their orientation significantly different from
that  of  a  parent.  More  than  this,  though,  where  the  people  being
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researched are adults and are not ill, the case for researchers having an
obligation  to  care  for  them,  in  any  strong  sense,  is  open  to  serious
question. As in the case of justice, there is a severe danger that a strong
commitment to care will be at the expense of the primary responsibility
that researchers have to try to ensure that what they produce is sound
knowledge. And, contrary to what has sometimes been argued (Reinharz
1992; Gunzenhauser 2006), there is no good reason to believe that caring
relationships  confer  epistemological  privilege,  so  that  researchers
adopting this  orientation are  more likely to  produce  sound knowledge
than those who do not. Moreover, here again, we can ask whether the
alternative ethics would require the researcher to care for all the various
types  of  person  that  they  study,  some  of  whom  may  belong  to  an
oppressor group.
Equally important, a commitment to care can be in conflict with
other  ethical  considerations,  as  many  feminists  recognise  (Kuhse
1997:ch6). We can see this if we examine a situation where the rationale
for applying an ethic of care to the research process is most obvious – in
studies concerned with people who are vulnerable in some respect. Take
the case  of  research involving young children.  As might  be expected,
much  of  the  literature  concerning  this  type  of  research  insists  that
researchers  have  an  obligation  to  protect  them,  not  just  from  harms
arising within the research process itself but also from other threats to
their well-being (see, for example, Farrell 2005). However, at the same
time, there is a wariness among many in this field towards the idea that
children  need  special  protection  because  they  are  vulnerable.  In  fact,
greater emphasis has increasingly come to be placed upon their rights to
autonomy – and the idea that they must be protected is seen as at odds
with this, and perhaps even as disguising adult control (see, for example,
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Stainton Rogers 2009). 
So, care as an ethical principle can be criticised as a covert form of
control.  After all,  the relationship that is taken as the model is not an
egalitarian one: even if the mother makes decisions ‘in the best interests
of  the  child’,  these  will  often  be  at  odds  with  the  latter’s  desires  or
expressed preferences. This point links to other discussions of care in the
philosophical literature, for instance those in the writings of Heidegger
and Foucault.  Heidegger identifies an inauthentic form of care in which
the  other  is  dominated  and  dependent  (Heidegger  1962:158/122).
Meanwhile, much of Foucault’s work focused on modern agencies and
forms  of  thought  centred  on  ‘care’ –  psychiatry,  and  medicine  more
generally  –  which  he  argues  amount  to  normalising  and  controlling
processes (Gutting 2005:86 and  passim). Both these authors offer more
positive, alternative conceptions of care, but these stand at some distance
from that  promoted by much feminist  ethics of  care.  Thus,  Heidegger
regards authentic care as ‘releasing’: it enables others to stand on their
own  feet  (Heidegger  1962:158-9/122;  Inwood 1999:35-7).  And  in  his
later writings Foucault is concerned with ‘self-care’, this being aimed at
resisting  normalising  processes  in  the  name  of  fashioning  one’s  own
self.13
There are questions, then, about the significance and role of care as
an ethical principle, both in general terms and in the specific context of
research.  There  are  occupations  in  which  care,  in  a  distinctive  sense,
plays a central role in relationships with clients. However, the people that
social researchers study are not their clients, and it is far from clear that
caring  should  be  a  central  feature  of  this  relationship,  as  our  earlier
13 For a discussion of the implications of Foucault’s work for research ethics, see Authors 2014.
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examples of  research on bankers and terrorists  highlighted.  More than
this, care is not the unalloyed good that seems to be assumed in the new
ethics. Indeed, its salience, its role, and its relationship with other ethical
considerations are problematic matters that require examination.
So, while care is an important ethical principle, like justice it is a
contested concept, and not one whose relevance to research ethics can be
taken for granted. Furthermore, its implications are at odds with some of
the other principles to which the alternative ethics seems to be committed,
including justice.14 
Conclusion
This  article  has  examined  an  alternative  approach  to  research  ethics
developed by some qualitative researchers in explicit opposition to the
‘standard view’ – the one that has come to be institutionalized through the
spread of ethical  regulation. We outlined the arguments that constitute
this new approach, noting the wide range of ethical concepts to which it
appeals.  We argued that there are some serious problems with what is
proposed.  There  is  often  a  lack  of  clarity  about  the  meaning  of  the
concepts  employed,  an  absence  of  supporting  argument  for  their
significance,  and  a  failure  to  address  the  ways  in  which  they  carry
conflicting implications in particular  cases.  We illustrated this through
detailed examination of two of the principles central to the new ethics:
justice  and  care.  While  these  are  clearly  important,  it  is  not  hard  to
14 See Edwards and Mauthner 2012:21-5. Some have argued that the conflict between these two 
principles arises only where justice is interpreted in Kantian terms: see Kuhse et al 1996. However, in 
our view conflicts are likely to arise even where more utilitarian interpretations of justice are 
employed.
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recognize  that  there  may  well  be  situations  in  which  acting  justly
conflicts  with  the  adoption  of  a  caring  attitude.  Moreover,  it  seems
evident that there must be limits on any obligation to pursue or realize
justice and care within the research process, given that these are not its
main goals; as indeed there are with other forms of practice. It seems to
us that there are some unanswered questions about the meaning and role
of justice and care in the context of the new ethics. And the same seems
to be true of many of the other principles to which it appeals.
Perhaps  the  central  practical  recommendation  of  the  alternative
ethics is for participatory forms of inquiry. This reflects a broad socio-
political philosophy which is at odds with that underpinning most social
science.  The  latter  involves  a  liberal  acceptance  of  the  division  of
occupational  tasks  and  responsibilities  and  the  limits  associated  with
these; and a distrust of utopianism in favour of a realism that emphasizes
recognition of the constraints on action. Even aside from this, we argued
that  the  commitment  to  participatory  inquiry  does  not  follow
automatically from the principles proposed, and that it is sharply at odds
with what ought to be the central concern of all  social  researchers:  to
produce sound knowledge (Authors 2012). In effect, the alternative ethics
abandons  this  commitment,  and  thereby  contravenes  the  primary
principle of any social research ethics.
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